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A customer asked that we check out his intranet site, which was used by the company's employees and customers. This was part of a larger security review, and though we'd not actually used SQL injection to penetrate a network before, we were pretty familiar with the general concepts. We were completely successful in this engagement, and wanted to recount the steps taken as an illustration.
"SQL Injection" is subset of the an unverified/unsanitized user input vulnerability ("buffer overflows" are a different subset), and the idea is to convince the application to run SQL code that was not intended. If the application is creating SQL strings naively on the fly and then running them, it's straightforward to create some real surprises.
We'll note that this was a somewhat winding road with more than one wrong turn, and others with more experience will certainly have different -- and better -- approaches. But the fact that we were successful does suggest that we were not entirely misguided.
There have been other papers on SQL injection, including some that are much more detailed, but this one shows the rationale of discovery as much as the process of exploitation.
This appeared to be an entirely custom application, and we had no prior knowledge of the application nor access to the source code: this was a "blind" attack. A bit of poking showed that this server ran Microsoft's IIS 6 along with ASP.NET, and this suggested that the database was Microsoft's SQL server: we believe that these techniques can apply to nearly any web application backed by any SQL server.
The login page had a traditional username-and-password form, but also an email-me-my-password link; the latter proved to be the downfall of the whole system.
When entering an email address, the system presumably looked in the user database for that email address, and mailed something to that address. Since my email address is not found, it wasn't going to send me anything.
So the first test in any SQL-ish form is to enter a single quote as part of the data: the intention is to see if they construct an SQL string literally without sanitizing. When submitting the form with a quote in the email address, we get a 500 error (server failure), and this suggests that the "broken" input is actually being parsed literally. Bingo.
We speculate that the underlying SQL code looks something like this:
SELECT fieldlist FROM table WHERE field = '$EMAIL';
Here, $EMAIL is the address submitted on the form by the user, and the larger query provides the quotation marks that set it off as a literal string. We don't know the specific names of the fields or table involved, but we do know their nature, and we'll make some good guesses later.
When we enter email@example.com' - note the closing quote mark - this yields constructed SQL:
SELECT fieldlist FROM table WHERE field = 'firstname.lastname@example.org'';
when this is executed, the SQL parser find the extra quote mark and aborts with a syntax error. How this manifests itself to the user depends on the application's internal error-recovery procedures, but it's usually different from "email address is unknown". This error response is a dead giveaway that user input is not being sanitized properly and that the application is ripe for exploitation.
Since the data we're filling in appears to be in the WHERE clause, let's change the nature of that clause in an SQL legal way and see what happens. By entering anything' OR 'x'='x, the resulting SQL is:
SELECT fieldlist FROM table WHERE field = 'anything' OR 'x'='x';
Because the application is not really thinking about the query - merely constructing a string - our use of quotes has turned a single-component WHERE clause into a two-component one, and the 'x'='x' clause is guaranteed to be true no matter what the first clause is (there is a better approach for this "always true" part that we'll touch on later).
But unlike the "real" query, which should return only a single item each time, this version will essentially return every item in the members database. The only way to find out what the application will do in this circumstance is to try it. Doing so, we were greeted with:
Your login information has been mailed to email@example.com.
Our best guess is that it's the first record returned by the query, effectively an entry taken at random. This person really did get this forgotten-password link via email, which will probably come as surprise to him and may raise warning flags somewhere.
We now know that we're able to manipulate the query to our own ends, though we still don't know much about the parts of it we cannot see. But we have observed three different responses to our various inputs:
The first two are responses to well-formed SQL, while the latter is for bad SQL: this distinction will be very useful when trying to guess the structure of the query.
The first steps are to guess some field names: we're reasonably sure that the query includes "email address" and "password", and there may be things like "US Mail address" or "userid" or "phone number". We'd dearly love to perform a SHOW TABLE, but in addition to not knowing the name of the table, there is no obvious vehicle to get the output of this command routed to us.
So we'll do it in steps. In each case, we'll show the whole query as we know it, with our own snippets shown specially. We know that the tail end of the query is a comparison with the email address, so let's guess email as the name of the field:
SELECT fieldlist FROM table WHERE field = 'x' AND email IS NULL; --';
The intent is to use a proposed field name (email) in the constructed query and find out if the SQL is valid or not. We don't care about matching the email address (which is why we use a dummy 'x'), and the -- marks the start of an SQL comment. This is an effective way to "consume" the final quote provided by application and not worry about matching them.
If we get a server error, it means our SQL is malformed and a syntax error was thrown: it's most likely due to a bad field name. If we get any kind of valid response, we guessed the name correctly. This is the case whether we get the "email unknown" or "password was sent" response.
Note, however, that we use the AND conjunction instead of OR: this is intentional. In the SQL schema mapping phase, we're not really concerned with guessing any particular email addresses, and we do not want random users inundated with "here is your password" emails from the application - this will surely raise suspicions to no good purpose. By using the AND conjunction with an email address that couldn't ever be valid, we're sure that the query will always return zero rows and never generate a password-reminder email.
Submitting the above snippet indeed gave us the "email address unknown" response, so now we know that the email address is stored in a field email. If this hadn't worked, we'd have tried email_address or mail or the like. This process will involve quite a lot of guessing.
Next we'll guess some other obvious names: password, user ID, name, and the like. These are all done one at a time, and anything other than "server failure" means we guessed the name correctly.
SELECT fieldlist FROM table WHERE email = 'x' AND userid IS NULL; --';
As a result of this process, we found several valid field names:
There are certainly more (and a good source of clues is the names of the fields on forms), but a bit of digging did not discover any. But we still don't know the name of the table that these fields are found in - how to find out?
The application's built-in query already has the table name built into it, but we don't know what that name is: there are several approaches for finding that (and other) table names. The one we took was to rely on a subselect.
A standalone query of
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tabname
Returns the number of records in that table, and of course fails if the table name is unknown. We can build this into our string to probe for the table name:
SELECT email, passwd, login_id, full_name FROM table WHERE email = 'x' AND 1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM tabname); --';
We don't care how many records are there, of course, only whether the table name is valid or not. By iterating over several guesses, we eventually determined that members was a valid table in the database. But is it the table used in this query? For that we need yet another test using table.field notation: it only works for tables that are actually part of this query, not merely that the table exists.
SELECT email, passwd, login_id, full_name FROM members WHERE email = 'x' AND members.email IS NULL; --';
When this returned "Email unknown", it confirmed that our SQL was well formed and that we had properly guessed the table name. This will be important later, but we instead took a different approach in the interim.
At this point we have a partial idea of the structure of the members table, but we only know of one username: the random member who got our initial "Here is your password" email. Recall that we never received the message itself, only the address it was sent to. We'd like to get some more names to work with, preferably those likely to have access to more data.
The first place to start, of course, is the company's website to find who is who: the "About us" or "Contact" pages often list who's running the place. Many of these contain email addresses, but even those that don't list them can give us some clues which allow us to find them with our tool.
The idea is to submit a query that uses the LIKE clause, allowing us to do partial matches of names or email addresses in the database, each time triggering the "We sent your password" message and email. Warning: though this reveals an email address each time we run it, it also actually sends that email, which may raise suspicions. This suggests that we take it easy.
We can do the query on email name or full name (or presumably other information), each time putting in the % wildcards that LIKE supports:
SELECT email, passwd, login_id, full_name FROM members WHERE email = 'x' OR full_name LIKE '%Bob%';
Keep in mind that even though there may be more than one "Bob", we only get to see one of them: this suggests refining our LIKE clause narrowly.
Ultimately, we may only need one valid email address to leverage our way in.
One can certainly attempt brute-force guessing of passwords at the main login page, but many systems make an effort to detect or even prevent this. There could be logfiles, account lockouts, or other devices that would substantially impede our efforts, but because of the non-sanitized inputs, we have another avenue that is much less likely to be so protected.
We'll instead do actual password testing in our snippet by including the email name and password directly. In our example, we'll use our victim, firstname.lastname@example.org and try multiple passwords.
SELECT email, passwd, login_id, full_name FROM members WHERE email = 'email@example.com' AND passwd = 'hello123';
This is clearly well-formed SQL, so we don't expect to see any server errors, and we'll know we found the password when we receive the "your password has been mailed to you" message. Our mark has now been tipped off, but we do have his password.
This procedure can be automated with scripting in perl, and though we were in the process of creating this script, we ended up going down another road before actually trying it.
So far, we have done nothing but query the database, and even though a SELECT is readonly, that doesn't mean that SQL is. SQL uses the semicolon for statement termination, and if the input is not sanitized properly, there may be nothing that prevents us from stringing our own unrelated command at the end of the query.
The most drastic example is:
SELECT email, passwd, login_id, full_name FROM members WHERE email = 'x'; DROP TABLE members; --'; -- Boom!
The first part provides a dummy email address -- 'x' -- and we don't care what this query returns: we're just getting it out of the way so we can introduce an unrelated SQL command. This one attempts to drop (delete) the entire members table, which really doesn't seem too sporting.
This shows that not only can we run separate SQL commands, but we can also modify the database. This is promising.
Given that we know the partial structure of the members table, it seems like a plausible approach to attempt adding a new record to that table: if this works, we'll simply be able to login directly with our newly-inserted credentials.
This, not surprisingly, takes a bit more SQL, and we've wrapped it over several lines for ease of presentation, but our part is still one contiguous string:
SELECT email, passwd, login_id, full_name FROM members WHERE email = 'x'; INSERT INTO members ('email','passwd','login_id','full_name') VALUES ('firstname.lastname@example.org','hello','steve','Steve Friedl');--';
Even if we have actually gotten our field and table names right, several things could get in our way of a successful attack:
In the case at hand, we hit a roadblock on either #4 or #5 - we can't really be sure -- because when going to the main login page and entering in the above username + password, a server error was returned. This suggests that fields we did not populate were vital, but nevertheless not handled properly.
A possible approach here is attempting to guess the other fields, but this promises to be a long and laborious process: though we may be able to guess other "obvious" fields, it's very hard to imagine the bigger-picture organization of this application.
We ended up going down a different road.
We then realized that though we are not able to add a new record to the members database, we can modify an existing one, and this proved to be the approach that gained us entry.
From a previous step, we knew that email@example.com had an account on the system, and we used our SQL injection to update his database record with our email address:
SELECT email, passwd, login_id, full_name FROM members WHERE email = 'x'; UPDATE members SET email = 'firstname.lastname@example.org' WHERE email = 'email@example.com';
After running this, we of course received the "we didn't know your email address", but this was expected due to the dummy email address provided. The UPDATE wouldn't have registered with the application, so it executed quietly.
We then used the regular "I lost my password" link - with the updated email address - and a minute later received this email:
From: firstname.lastname@example.org To: email@example.com Subject: Intranet login This email is in response to your request for your Intranet log in information. Your User ID is: bob Your password is: hello
Now it was now just a matter of following the standard login process to access the system as a high-ranked MIS staffer, and this was far superior to a perhaps-limited user that we might have created with our INSERT approach.
We found the intranet site to be quite comprehensive, and it included - among other things - a list of all the users. It's a fair bet that many Intranet sites also have accounts on the corporate Windows network, and perhaps some of them have used the same password in both places. Since it's clear that we have an easy way to retrieve any Intranet password, and since we had located an open PPTP VPN port on the corporate firewall, it should be straightforward to attempt this kind of access.
We had done a spot check on a few accounts without success, and we can't really know whether it's "bad password" or "the Intranet account name differs from the Windows account name". But we think that automated tools could make some of this easier.
In this particular engagement, we obtained enough access that we did not feel the need to do much more, but other steps could have been taken. We'll touch on the ones that we can think of now, though we are quite certain that this is not comprehensive.
We are also aware that not all approaches work with all databases, and we can touch on some of them here.
We believe that web application developers often simply do not think about "surprise inputs", but security people do (including the bad guys), so there are three broad approaches that can be applied here.
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 0123456789 @.-_+
Sidebar on email addresses
It's important to note here that email addresses in particular are troublesome to validate programmatically, because everybody seems to have his own idea about what makes one "valid", and it's a shame to exclude a good email address because it contains a character you didn't think about.
The only real authority is RFC 2822 (which encompasses the more familiar RFC822), and it includes a fairly expansive definition of what's allowed. The truly pedantic may well wish to accept email addresses with ampersands and asterisks (among other things) as valid, but others - including this author - are satisfied with a reasonable subset that includes "most" email addresses.
Those taking a more restrictive approach ought to be fully aware of the consequences of excluding these addresses, especially considering that better techniques (prepare/execute, stored procedures) obviate the security concerns which those "odd" characters present.
SELECT fieldlist FROM table WHERE id = 23 OR 1=1; -- Boom! Always matches!
SELECT fieldlist FROM customers WHERE name = 'Bill O''Reilly'; -- works OK
SELECT fieldlist FROM customers WHERE name = '\''; DROP TABLE users; --'; -- Boom!
$sth = $dbh->prepare("SELECT email, userid FROM members WHERE email = ?;"); $sth->execute($email);
Statement s = connection.createStatement(); ResultSet rs = s.executeQuery("SELECT email FROM member WHERE name = " + formField); // *boom*
PreparedStatement ps = connection.prepareStatement( "SELECT email FROM member WHERE name = ?"); ps.setString(1, formField); ResultSet rs = ps.executeQuery();
Note that not all databases are configured the same way, and not all even support the same dialect of SQL (the "S" stands for "Structured", not "Standard"). For instance, most versions of MySQL do not support subselects, nor do they usually allow multiple statements: these are substantially complicating factors when attempting to penetrate a network.
We'd like to emphasize that though we chose the "Forgotten password" link to attack in this particular case, it wasn't really because this particular web application feature is dangerous. It was simply one of several available features that might have been vulnerable, and it would be a mistake to focus on the "Forgotten password" aspect of the presentation.
This Tech Tip has not been intended to provide comprehensive coverage on SQL injection, or even a tutorial: it merely documents the process that evolved over several hours during a contracted engagement. We've seen other papers on SQL injection discuss the technical background, but still only provide the "money shot" that ultimately gained them access.
But that final statement required background knowledge to pull off, and the process of gathering that information has merit too. One doesn't always have access to source code for an application, and the ability to attack a custom application blindly has some value.
Last modified: Wed Oct 10 06:28:06 PDT 2007